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We study team incentives under complementarities, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Experts privately know whether their assigned components require costly repair. The principal observes only participation, not effort, and seeks to uniquely implement high quality under belief-free rationalizability (Bergemann and Morris, 2017). Standard contracts rewarding only participation fail to elicit private information, leaving the principal exposed to high coordination rents. We show that a "pay-to-quit" contract—which offers a higher success bonus for opting out than for participating—strictly reduces implementation costs.

An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.